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Abortion should never have become a criterion of conservative, Christian identity, 
because abortion procedures are private operations concerning patients alone. Abortions have no 
place in the public sphere. Behind every abortion is a personal tale of unique difficulties and 
private choices. In Colorado, 2003, 24-year-old “Lauren” decided to obtain an abortion because 
her pregnancy resulted from an abusive relationship. Years later, Lauren recalled her drive to the 
abortion clinic and the pro-life protesters lining the road to taunt patients with “awful, very 
graphic signs.”1 She pushed forward with her decision to abort as it was the best option in an 
abusive domestic relationship. “When I got pregnant,” Lauren later recalled, “I knew right away 
I didn’t want a lifelong connection to that person.”2 Four years later, in West Virginia, another 
woman aborted her pregnancy for very different reasons. “Rachel” had been born to a family 
with a history of mental illness. Rachel, herself, had been diagnosed with schizoaffective 
disorder. She and her husband had decided years ago not to raise a family, to cease the 
generational cycle of mental illness. After an unexpected pregnancy, the couple drove three and a 
half hours to Maryland for an abortion procedure. Pro-life protestors threw “themselves on their 
knees with holy water”3. Rachel, however, never regretted her choice.4 Throughout America, 
personal lives are judged by public pro-life debates. “All of it is an effort to guilt me into feeling 
shame over something that I should never feel shame about,” writes North Carolina abortion 
provider Calla Hales. “Abortion care isn’t about religion or faith – it’s about a woman’s right to 
choose what medical care she receives for her body.”5 Institutions and interest groups concerned 
with upholding Christian-based, conservative identities espouse a pro-life ideology at the 
expense of individual privacy. 
Historians and political scientists have written extensively on the topic of abortion, but 
few have discussed the “identity” groups derive from abortion politics. Admittedly, few aspects 
  Brown  3 
 
   
 
of modern abortion politics remain unexplored. A number of historians, for example, have traced 
the chronological development of abortion policy and public opinion in America. Historians 
James C. Mohr and David J. Garrow are perhaps the most recognized authors in this particular 
field.6 Other scholars, like historian Rickie Solinger and philosopher Leslie Cannold, have drawn 
on oral histories/testimonies to emphasize patient experiences.7 Researchers have even proposed 
a cross-disciplinary study of media influence on abortion pollicization (e.g. Celeste Michelle 
Condit’s Decoding Abortion Rhetoric and Deanna Rohlinger’s Abortion Politics).8 Abortion, 
nonetheless, remains one of the most intriguing subjects for studying public life. In the words of 
former UNLV professor Ted Jelen, “Beneath this clear statement [of reproductive rights] lays the 
most contentious political, legal, and cultural issue in America today.”9 By drawing on the 
insights of past scholarship, a new perspective may be gleaned from the modern abortion 
controversy in the context of group identity formation.  Primary sources will include medical 
journals, newspaper articles, state and federal laws, political handbooks, church decrees, visual 
sources, and statistical info. Borrowing from journalist Tom Wolfe, perhaps abortion is just 
another way for “we, the enlightened (lit by the sparks at the apexes of our souls), [to] hereby 
separate ourselves from the lost souls around us.”10 Identity is integral to the way contemporary 
citizens situate themselves in an ever-growing, impersonal world, and is thus relevant to 
scholarly research. 
Modern abortion politics is a manufactured controversy that exploits an inherently private 
choice for the sake of morally-based social identities. Abortion politics is “manufactured” 
because the procedure did not stir public debate in early nineteenth-century America, nor did it 
become a “political” issue until the late 1970s. The GOP was in a bind, desperately searching for 
provocative issues to increase its numbers after years of Democratic dominance in the 1930s and 
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into the 1960s. The Republican party defined modern “conservatism” and “American 
Christianity” as part of a national identity that incorporated pro-life ideology – to be Christian 
and conservative necessitates an anti-abortion stance. Applying sociological theory to history, 
psychologist Henri Tajfel’s “social identity theory” offers an important framework for analyzing 
the fluctuating legal and cultural treatment of abortion within the U.S.11 (Figure 1). Christians 
searching for a more traditional outlook embrace pro-life doctrines (“saving” infants) as “a 
system of orientation for self-reference, [to] create and define the individual's place in society”.12 
There is a psychological underpinning within groups spearheading the modern abortion 
movement, a sort of give-and-take between leaders who need political/monetary support and 
individuals who hope for a moral identity in public life. The modern pro-life movement is not 
reflective of American traditions. Abortion was legal 180 years ago13 and was rarely regulated.14 
Early Americans would be bemused by today’s March-For-Life demonstrations and the tense 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings centered on the “abortion question” (Figures 2 and 3). 
Abortion was always a private issue until certain groups found it expedient to cast abortion as a 
public, moral topic and a premise of conservative, Christian identity. 
 Abortion evolved into a public concern within the last fifty years and history can help 
explain the mechanisms that facilitated abortion politicization. In 1800, abortion procedures fell 
under the traditions of British common law and were legally permitted throughout the early 
nineteenth century. Abortions were criminalized by the end of the 1800s after professional 
physician associations raised safety concerns. Roe v. Wade would have legalized abortion with 
little public outcry had it not been for interest groups from three main institutions: the 
Republican Party, Evangelical Protestantism, and the Catholic Church. The institutions brought 
national attention to abortion and introduced the “life at conception”15 notion to attract 
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membership/support from people who wanted to identify as moral agents, observers of “God’s 
Will”.16 For the Republican Party, abortion debates offered a platform to attract desirable voting 
blocs. Similarly, Protestant denominational sects — especially Evangelical churches — used 
abortion to create national unity for securing political influence. The Catholic Church, on the 
other hand, has officially shifted between relaxed guidelines and fierce opposition for centuries, 
depending on how it wanted to differentiate Catholic congregations from non-believers or 
heretics. The unifying thread that holds the modern pro-life movement together is not so much 
conservative values or religious beliefs, but a politically defined identity that is part of the new 
“Christian America”.17 Interest groups have a vested interest in politicizing abortion to attract 
members, gain political/monetary support, and to distinguish themselves from other groups. 
 
I. Before Roe v. Wade – The History of Abortion in America  
In 1800, abortion was a topic of the private sphere alone, a taboo subject that most 
Americans were happy to let well enough alone. No legislation governed or even mentioned 
abortion. The legal status of abortion drew on British common law which, generally speaking, 
permitted abortions up to the point of “quickening” (i.e. the first perception of fetal movement).18 
Most people, including devout church-goers, considered quickening to be a signal of when the 
fetus became its own independent entity. After quickening, local courts might consider abortion 
a crime, if a case was actually brought to court. Even so, convicted patients and abortionists (i.e. 
abortion doctors) were treated leniently and never at the same level as murderers.19 Early 
nineteenth-century medical knowledge was limited. What doctors did know was that the fetus 
was unviable before a certain point and most were quite willing to accommodate women who 
requested treatment for “obstructed menses” (a term that applied to unnatural blockages or 
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pregnancy).20 More common abortion procedures, however, were home remedies – abortifacient 
drugs and techniques openly recommended by medical manuals, women’s health books, 
midwives, professional and homeopathic practitioners, or even private social circles (Figures  4, 
5, and 6).21 Socially, early nineteenth-century America stereotyped abortion patients as “victims 
of passion”, unmarried women who needed abortions to hide an “illegitimate love.”22 Married 
women also received abortions, but their cases were politely ignored by mainstream popular 
culture. “Americans could and did look the other way when they encountered abortion,” writes 
historian James Mohr. “Nothing in their medical knowledge or in the rulings of the court 
compelled them to do otherwise, and ...there was considerable compassion for the women 
involved.”23 Abortions were hardly controversial in 1800 and did not contribute to conservative, 
Christian identity. 
From 1820 and through the 1840s, abortion came into “public view” with the 
implementation of explicit state laws.24 By the mid-1840s, ten states and a federal territory 
passed laws that overtly mentioned abortion.25 The laws, however, were not bans but regulations, 
usually concerned with the dangerous use of poisons as abortifacients.26 Furthermore, the 
language of these legal documents was aimed at commercialized abortion providers, not the 
private realm where women might grow their own plants for abortifacient drugs or seek the 
counsel of medical practitioners.27 At the time, abortionists had become quite bold and were 
posting advertisements in several newspapers, something that seemed potentially dangerous 
given the risky nature of abortions in the Victorian Age. It is important to note that the new laws 
did not significantly alter public perception of abortions. None of these state laws were passed 
independently in and of themselves, but were instead included as added provisions to extensive 
criminal code revisions. No legislator tried to take an outward stand on abortion. Moreover, the 
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popular press – even religious papers – did not deem the abortion regulations worth mentioning 
and they certainly did not promote such laws in the first place.28 People still regarded quickening 
as the criterion for judging abortions and, as a University of Pennsylvania professor wrote in 
1839, the common view persisted that abortions were generally employed “to destroy the fruit of 
illicit pleasure under the vain hope of preserving [women’s] reputation by this unnatural... 
sacrifice.”29 In other words, society and local politicians typically condoned abortions towards 
the mid-1800s. 
What changed between 1820 and 1840 was the consensus in the medical community 
regarding reproductive treatments. In the first half of the nineteenth century, a new collective of 
college-educated, scientifically trained physicians, called “regulars”, started to oppose 
practitioners who lacked formal schooling. Informal physicians included more traditional 
caregivers or new entries of the field (homeopaths and midwives), all of whom came to be 
termed “irregulars.” The regulars wanted to create a medical field of “professionals” — well-
paid, respected, and regulated.30 The regulars’ reasonings were ethical, economic, and 
egotistically driven: “Doctors’ incomes fell sharply and regular physicians were being driven not 
only from high social status, but out of the profession itself”.31 Abortion patients got caught in 
the crossfire of this budding war between regulars and irregulars. Frankly, irregulars dominated 
the abortion field by offering affordable care and remaining non-judgmental of their patients. A 
number of “unprofessional” female practitioners had established successful abortion businesses, 
the most famous being Madame Restell, who operated offices in three cities for 35 years 
beginning in the 1830s.32 “To Married Women,” Madame Restell advertised, “Is it moral for 
parents to increase their families, regardless of consequences to themselves, or the well-being of 
their offspring, when a simple, easy, healthy, and certain remedy is within our control?”33 Early 
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abortion laws reflected the regulars’ anxieties regarding the future of their medical field,34 ergo 
the legal focus on abortionists rather than patients themselves in states such as Illinois.35 The 
regulars wanted to get irregulars out of their market. Legislators were more than happy to oblige 
the regulars’ position since 1820s America tended to view all practitioners as “quacks” in need 
of regulation.36 The anxieties of regulars, however, would lay the foundation for a complete legal 
overhaul by 1900. 
From around the 1850s and to the end of the 19th century, abortion was attacked in 
nearly every state by what Historian James Mohr calls the “physicians’ crusade.”37 The reasons 
for these legal reversals are multifaceted. Several abortion tragedies occurred in the 1840s. In 
New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Iowa, a number of women died from botched 
procedures. Newspaper businesses were growing rapidly at the time and they were keen on 
exploiting tragic news. Wily reporters caught on to the fact that readers were sensitive about the 
death of young women.38 “Charge of Murder – A Case of Solemn Warning ...” declared the 
Brooklyn Daily Eagle after the young, unmarried Maria Aldrich died from an abortion arranged 
by her callous lover. “A charge of murdering Maria A. Aldrich… caused by a successful attempt 
to procure an abortion.”39 Abortion clinics did not help their own images, becoming more 
commercialized and turning to printed ads when these tragic stories were still hot off the press. 
The growing publicity brought new attention to cases involving married patients, respectable 
wives and mothers who seemed to be endangering themselves or engaging in promiscuity. State 
legislatures felt the need to respond with restrictions, if only to protect women and maintain 
some sort of order in the risky medical sphere.40 The most important opposition to abortion, 
however, arose after 1857, namely the American Medical Association (AMA). Essentially a 
guild/union for regulars, the AMA led a campaign against abortions under the leadership of a 
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young obstetrics and gynecology specialist, Horatio Robinson Storer.41 The AMA brought 
organized tactics to the regulars’ cause, to “win professional power, control medical practice, and 
restrict their competitors”.42 Regular physicians opposed abortion to promote standardization and 
uniformity in medical care. 
Regular physicians also felt a certain obligation towards society, a need to channel their 
expertise for the benefit of all. Doctors wanted to use their wisdom to help guide society,43 and 
thus assume their “ancient and rightful place among society’s policymakers and savants”.44 “The 
hospital was a temple in which presided a god,” Dr Walter Channing declared before the 1845 
incoming class of Harvard Medical. “The physician had an important place in society…”.45 
Some professional doctors considered abortion a crime because, at the time, they disagreed on 
embryo viability, regardless of religious views that firmly held quickening to be the beginning of 
life. Sociologically, a number of physicians also wanted to control the genetic makeup of 
America. Eugenics was taking shape in the latter half of the 1800s. Most regulars came from a 
common stock: white, native-born Protestants with British and Northern European ancestry. 
They looked upon the increase of foreign immigrants with growing disconcertment and lamented 
that abortions were more frequent amongst native Protestants than predominantly Catholic 
immigrants. A Michigan doctor bewailed the “annual destruction of foetuses”, predicting that 
“the Puritanic blood of ‘76 will be sparingly represented in the approaching centenary”.46 The 
AMA was referencing the bible to combat abortion in the nineteenth century when Protestant 
churches were silent on the matter. “Scripture informs us that barrenness was in former days 
regarded as a reproach,” the AMA affirmed, “that it was looked upon as a mark of God's 
displeasure”.47 Concerns about the future of gender relations also influenced the regulars’ 
reasoning, as many perceived abortion among married, native-born to be a sign of women’s 
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failure to uphold their natural maternal duties. Educated women happened to be fighting for 
admittance into America’s medical schools during this time.48 Consequently, the AMA proved to 
be the most tenacious and successful anti-abortion group in U.S. history. 
The legal framework instituted by the AMA determined the criminality and social 
perception of abortion up until Roe v. Wade. Every state had legislated criminal statutes on 
abortion in the late 1800s49 so that abortion was illegal nationwide by 1900. 50 The federal 
Comstock Law of 1873 compounded restrictions by banning “any article or thing designed or 
intended for the prevention of conception or procuring abortion.”51 The abortion laws enacted in 
this brief period remained largely unchallenged until the 1960s. During this time, public opinion 
on the matter fluctuated with the decade. In the 1930s, for example, prosecutions of abortionists 
and abortion patients were rare, but prosecutions rose in the 1950s in response to stricter 
standards of sexual relations.52 A number of states allowed therapeutic exceptions when the 
mother’s life was at stake.53 It is also noteworthy to mention that from the mid-1800s to the 
1930s, abortion laws were typically enforced only if a patient died, thus confirming the long-
standing assumption that safe abortions were permissible.54 The patients themselves were rarely 
prosecuted; the threat of prosecution merely served as a bargaining tool to induce testimony 
against “unprofessional” physicians.55 More importantly, abortion procedures did not decline. 
Laws could not change the hardships or personal circumstances that necessitated 
abortions/contraception for millions of American women. Death records suggest that, in 1930, 
one in every five maternal deaths resulted from botched abortions. Nationwide, between 200,000 
and 1.2 million abortions were performed every year in the 1950s and ‘60s. 56 Professional 
doctors controlled access to legal abortions, as it was through their judgment alone that the 
procedure could be legitimized as “therapeutic” 57 and given a seal of approval.58 The AMA 
  Brown  11 
 
   
 
succeeded in controlling women’s reproductive health while public opinion remained fairly 
unchanged on the matter. 
Criminal codes did not improve patient safety or eliminate the incidence of abortion 
procedures in America. Practically speaking, Roe v. Wade was actually a logical response to the 
failures of criminalized abortion. Regulations endangered women despite the intentions of 
nineteenth-century lawmakers to phase out risky abortions. As mentioned earlier, women 
continued to die from abortions especially in the decades before the introduction of antibiotics in 
the 1940s.59 The legal environment forced qualified, well-intentioned irregulars out of abortion 
care and facilitated the proliferation of profit-oriented “abortion syndicates” that preyed on 
vulnerable, desperate women.60 Diane McDermott, a married Oregonian woman, was nearly 
killed by a botched abortion in 1935. “He [the abortionist] did it on the kitchen table even though 
I begged for something better,” McDermott later remembered. “He wouldn’t give me an 
anesthetic either, said it would smell too much. Afterwards, I felt like I was going to die.”61 Of 
course, not all women suffered such tragic consequences, but their chances depended on their 
circumstances and resources. Well-to-do women with good connections to family physicians 
could obtain legal access to contraception and other reproductive controls. Others paid to travel 
out of the country to receive treatment from European abortion clinics. Less privileged women, 
however, had few such options — operating on themselves or trusting word-of-mouth references. 
Interstate abortions became a common trend in the mid-1900s. The odds of a patient finding 
good healthcare or a ruthless hack depended largely on chance. Women could not turn to the law 
for protection. It is no accident that the Supreme Court cited medical safety as a compelling 
reason for national reform in the very text of Roe.62 
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II. Interest Group Identity — The Republican Party 
The next major turning point in national abortion policy took place in the Civil Rights era 
— the decade of the 1960s. Patriarchal ideals and deep-seated traditions were losing force in a 
skeptical youth culture impacted by the tragedy of Vietnam and the mobilization of African 
American activists. With the Summer of Love in 1967 and the Sexual Revolution, Americans 
began to talk about intimacy and reproductive controls in public life, disregarding past taboos. 
Abortion emerged as just one aspect of widespread social reform, but it was an issue that 
feminists and medical experts felt could not be relegated to the shadows any longer. By this time, 
the AMA no longer opposed abortion wholesale — times had changed and so had the 
motivations of physicians’ primary association. Furthermore, communities felt less embarrassed 
about admitting the prevalence of reproductive procedures especially when the lives of patients 
and the freedom of reputable abortionists were at stake. When Dr. William Jennings Bryan 
Henries was jailed in 1962 for performing abortions in Grove, Oklahoma, half of the town 
arranged a gathering in protest: “It was the first time a community, in fact, a good part of the 
state had to examine its feelings about abortion and decide whether to support or repudiate a 
doctor who had put his reputation on the line,” recalled another abortion provider.63 Dr. Henries 
would later emerge from prison an inflamed activist who spent the rest of his life fighting for 
abortion legalization.64 Generally speaking, mainstream culture was becoming more liberal. 
After nearly a hundred years, Americans were contemplating the possible benefit of legalizing 
abortion, but they did not articulate their arguments along pro-life or pro-choice identities. 
An incident that captured the interest of national news outlets also pushed the issue of 
abortion into public view. In the same year as Dr. Henries’ arrest (1962), the entire country 
would be forced to revisit the abortion question because of a drug called thalidomide. 
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Pharmaceutical companies had sold thalidomide as a clinically safe sleeping sedative until 
researchers revealed in 1962 that pregnant women who took the drug gave birth to children with 
malformed limbs. The images and stories of children affected by thalidomide were quite 
distressing; couples began to wonder whether a pregnancy should be aborted if only to save a 
child from a lifetime of pain or premature death.65 The news had prompted an Arizona television 
personality, Sherri Finkbine, to seek an abortion. Finkbine was pregnant with her fifth child 
when she learned that she had accidentally taken thalidomide contained in a sleeping sedative her 
husband brought back from Europe.66 “The last thing we wanted to do,” her husband explained, 
“was bring a deformed youngster into the world if it could be prevented.”67 The issue exploded 
into a national controversy as Arizona only allowed abortions to save a mother’s life (Finkbine 
would eventually travel to Sweden for her operation).68 Coincidentally, a rubella epidemic broke 
out the following year (1963),69 keeping the abortion question in the public spotlight because the 
disease was also known to cause birth defects. Americans wondered whether abortion laws were 
too strict and insensitive to real-life problems. The 1960s, therefore, was a time when people of 
all walks of life were compelled by one condition or another to reexamine the status of abortion 
policy without identifying themselves along a pro-choice/pro-life spectrum. 
In the backdrop of the 1960s Counterculture, however, a reactionary conservative culture 
was taking root that would have long-term consequences on abortion. Just as some Americans 
were considering loosening abortion codes, others worried that relaxing the laws would diminish 
traditional values. A New Right was being born along the Sunbelt, in the West and South, and 
also in scattered White suburban centers to the North. The motivations for these emerging 
conservatives varied according to each group’s specific concerns. As the ‘70s approached, 
middle-class financial stability appeared as the new norm, making liberal, Democratic social 
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security programs a benefit for minorities rather than the general population. The middle-class 
favored reduced taxes, private economy, international isolationism, and traditional values.70 It 
looked upon the youth culture, African American protests, and women’s liberation with 
disconcertment and animosity. After all, the new trends were antithetical to the political and 
economic system that had favored the middle-class. On the other hand, Southern Whites were 
also distancing themselves from liberalism because the Democratic Party (the country’s liberal 
stronghold) supported African American rights. African American mobility also turned many 
northern urban/suburban Whites against liberalism because of racial competition over housing, 
schooling, and jobs. Perhaps the rise of Catholic communities — from 14 percent of the 
population in 191071 to 25 percent by 197072 — also contributed to more emphasis on 
conservative social conventions and anti-abortion ideas. Civil rights, Women’s Lib, and even 
abortion came to be viewed as signs of unfettered and dangerous liberalism. As the Christian 
Science Monitor declared in 1962, “People are tired of liberalism. There is a resurgence of 
thinking — a conservative renaissance”.73 The conservative renaissance was an opportunity for 
the reorganization of political parties and the formation of new interest group identities. 
A beleaguered GOP sought to tap into the conservative tide. The GOP had never been a 
far-right party, especially under the leadership of the moderate Eisenhower74 — yet these were 
desperate times. Since the 1930s and FDR’s refashioning of liberal philosophy, the Democratic 
Party held substantial electoral power. During the Great Depression and WWII, social programs 
appealed to Americans across varying racial, ideological, and class spectrums, thus creating a 
large, though eclectic, voting base for the Democrats. Republicans and their anti-interventionist 
stance were unappealing during times of hardship, leaving the GOP at a disadvantage for some 
time after the 1930s. As literary critic Lionel Trilling wrote in 1950, “in the United States at this 
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time liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition…” “It is the plain 
fact [that] there are no conservative or reactionary ideas in general circulation” but only “irritable 
mental gestures which seem to resemble ideas.”75 The Republican Party was at a loss on how to 
recover from its minority status — that is, until the late 1960s. Republican strategists spent years 
reviewing voting statistics and public opinion polls, concluding that Americans were leaning 
conservative, which spelled trouble for their rivals, the self-proclaimed liberal Democrats. The 
middle-class — suburbanites concerned over the country’s “political, economic, and moral 
decline” — promised to be an especially powerful voting base.76 The GOP needed to relabel 
itself to secure what Nixon called the “Silent Majority”, a segment of the population that pursued 
a conservative social identity.77 
White Southerners comprised another crucial voting bloc that the Republicans sought to 
carve out for themselves in the 1960s. Kevin Philips, a brilliant campaign strategist, is often 
credited with shaping the new Republican Party after publishing an influential and hotly 
contested book, The Emerging Republican Majority. As a “thesis” of American post-war society 
as well as a political “strategy”, the book theorized that, through a “southern strategy”, the GOP 
could revive itself by wooing White voters in the South away from their traditional Democratic 
loyalties.78 Like other political observers of the time, Philips recognized the importance of the 
middle-class but situated this socio-economic group within a larger trend. “The burgeoning 
middle-class suburbs are the logical extension of the new popular conservatism of the South, the 
West, and the Catholic sidewalks of New York,” Philips reasoned.79 His idea, however, 
depended on how well the GOP could meet the political ideals of disillusioned Southerners: 
racial segregation, school prayer, and a rejection of nontraditional values such as abortion. From 
an alternative perspective, perhaps Southern Whites were leaning away from the pro-abortion 
  Brown  16 
 
   
 
position because of concerns about maintaining the Anglo-American race (White, Protestant 
women tended to obtain abortions more often than other women).80 As with the middle-class, 
Republican leaders realized that they needed to appeal to conservative identity politics, or 
“populist conservatism”, in order to win over Southerners.81 
 Republican leaders wanted to connect the different groups of their base by creating a 
new unifying philosophy. Abortion became one aspect of this philosophy, alongside gun rights, 
school prayer, etc. Politicizing abortion took time, mainly because strategists did not foresee 
reproductive rights as a national controversy. Barry Goldwater, the first “true conservative” 
presidential candidate for the GOP, did not mention abortion in his 1964 campaign. He even 
opposed a public pro-life movement on the grounds that “the abortion issue has nothing to do 
with being liberal or conservative”.82 Nixon actually expanded the federal government’s 
initiatives in family planning.83 The marriage between pro-lifers and the Republican Party 
occurred in the 1976 Kansas City national convention. The presidential platform for that year 
included an anti-abortion constitutional amendment, despite the fact that most of the party 
members attending the convention were actually supportive of Roe v. Wade.84 Republicans 
understood that their party would lose influence unless they could extend their base. Nixon had 
spent years trying to accommodate pro-choice mainline Protestants and pro-life Catholics,85 but 
the language of pro-life — moralistic, traditionalist, and infused with references to God — could 
be advertised to more than just Catholic groups. In retrospect, the GOP’s timing was perfect. The 
sexual revolution had inadvertently cast reproductive choice in a bad light. Protestants started to 
wonder whether “abortion on demand” might promote “sexual promiscuity and 
permissiveness”.86 This was also the time of budding Evangelicalism, whose leaders — Jerry 
Falwell and Paul Weyrich — embraced the Catholic perspective of abortion (their reasonings are 
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explored in the next section). The stage was set for the GOP to transform into the party of pro-
life identity (see Figure 7.). 
The Republican Party would become inescapably entrenched in anti-abortion politics 
towards the ‘80s in a drama of two evangelical presidents: Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. 
Carter and Reagan represented two variants of the American Protestantism, only one of which 
would come to dominate politics and culture in the years to come. Carter was a progressive 
evangelical eager to promote racial equality, gender reform, and new social norms.87 On the 
issue of abortion, however, Carter had reached a personal and political conundrum. When Carter 
ran for office for his first term, he received backing from pro-lifers (mostly Catholic) and pro-
choice religious factions by playing the middle ground. In the re-election campaign for a second 
term, Reagan played the abortion card against Carter. In a burgeoning Evangelical movement 
“increasingly characterized as a moral crusade”, recent born-again Ronald Reagan listened to the 
advice of strategist Paul Weyrich and embraced pro-life.88 Carter still struggled with whether 
such a firm stance on the issue might polarize voters, blind to the powerful influence of Weyrich 
and Jerry Falwell over the Evangelical population.89 As the Washington Post reported in 1976, 
the accommodationist Carter frustrated both sides, as one voter aptly conveyed: “I think I’ve 
been sandbagged”.90 Religious revivals after the 1960s had given rise to fifty million “Born-
Again” Christians, as well as a more vocal Catholic populace that was trying to unite with 
American Protestants.91 Reagan chose to favor the trend of the Third Awakening. “If there is a 
question as to whether there is life or death,” Reagan wrote in soliloquy, “the doubt should be 
resolved in favor of life”92 (see Figure 10.). Both Carter and Reagan were part of forming the 
pro-life identity of the Republican party — today, only 21 percent of Republicans are pro-choice 
compared to 75 percent pro-life.93 
  Brown  18 
 
   
 
 
III. Pro-life Identity — Protestant Evangelicals 
The American Protestant position on abortion is as much a lesson on the fluidity of 
religious doctrine as it is an example of pragmatically defined social identity. As noted earlier, 
the anti-abortion position is not a longstanding doctrine of Protestant denominations. In fact, up 
until the 1970s, most American Protestants actually rejected any anti-abortion activism as a 
“Catholic issue”.94 In St. Louis, Missouri, 1971, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) issued a 
resolution that declared it would “allow the possibility of abortion under such conditions as rape, 
incest, clear evidence of severe fetal deformity”.95 Protestants may not have supported “abortion-
on-demand” and what they saw as a promotion of promiscuity, but almost all denominations 
allowed abortions under certain circumstances. More importantly, Protestants did not officially 
rally against abortion reforms in the 1960s. Admittedly, some protestants did join pro-life 
organizations prior to Roe v. Wade, but these were individuals motivated by personal beliefs, not 
their denominations’ official doctrines.96 Before Roe, the major pro-life organizations in the 
country were held by liberal Catholics and operated as formal or informal extensions of the 
Catholic Church.97 By 1980, Protestant Churches — especially Evangelical sects — would 
commit a 360-degree turn on the issue, with more evangelical Protestants, nationwide, opposing 
abortion than Catholics.98 The same Southern Baptist Convention that had been progressive 
towards abortion legalization in 1971 decided to adopt the Catholic Church’s practice of 
“Sanctity of Human Life Sunday” in 1986, a protest of Roe v. Wade every third Sunday of 
January.99 What happened in the span of a few years to cause this perplexing change in 
American Protestant identity? (see Figure 12.) 
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The conservative, Protestant, pro-life movement that influences our current political 
system originated from the sophistry of a few influential Evangelical leaders. In his 1980 book 
Listen, America!, televangelist Jerry Falwell made bold historical arguments. “From the days of 
Hammurabi,” wrote Falwell, “civilized people have always looked upon abortion as one of the 
vilest crimes.”100 Unless Falwell truly believed that American Protestants were uncivilized 
people prior to the late 1970s, he was merely throwing out provocative statements to touch an 
emotional chord with his readers. Jerry Falwell, along with political activist/commentator Paul 
Weyrich, deserves most of the credit for framing the modern anti-abortion movement. A 
Virginian with deep ties to Southern segregation, much of Falwell’s early speeches express 
concern over school prayer and educational desegregation. Segregation was the “Lord’s Will,” 
Falwell wrote.  “[Integration] will destroy our race eventually”.101 He would turn his attention 
towards abortion only around 1979, six long years after Roe. Paul Weyrich also exhibited little 
concern for pro-life and abortion issues early on. In fact, Weyrich only began to focus on the 
pro-life movement when he perceived it as a tool for fashioning a political voice for 
Evangelicals.102 Both men officially espoused anti-abortion as an Evangelical issue by founding 
the “Moral Majority” in 1979. Designed as an endorsement of Ronald Reagan and the 
Republican Party, the Moral Majority would have a complicated history in the ten years of its 
existence, but it was nonetheless pivotal in shaping the way all Americans came to view abortion 
and conservative Christian identity (see Figures 8 and 11). 
Falwell’s motivations rested in politics and, quite surprisingly, racial conflict. In January 
1970, the District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the IRS could deny tax benefits to 
religious schools practicing segregation in the little-known case of Green v. Kennedy.103 Green 
was one of the first steps taken by the courts to end “Segregation Academies”, inexpensive 
  Brown  20 
 
   
 
private schools erected in the aftermath of Brown v. The Board of Education by Southern Whites 
as a last-ditch effort to avoid integration.104 In 1971, the Supreme Court case Coit v. Green 
(1971) reaffirmed the IRS’s authority to withhold exemptions from segregated schools no matter 
the institutions’ claim to religious affiliation.105 Roe, of course, was decided just two years after 
Coit, and the timing contributed to Falwell’s later manipulation of abortion legalization. Falwell, 
who founded his own segregation academy in Lynchburg, Virginia, wanted to maintain the 
Southern way of life without paying any tax penalties. He turned to arguments of religious 
freedom and incorporated pro-life rhetoric to disguise his motives with moralistic identity that 
could appeal to a sympathizing public and perhaps even win over Christians from other, less 
racist regions of the U.S. In a jab to the IRS, without mentioning his true racist goals, Falwell 
wrote, “Each day more than 4,000 unborn babies are destroyed by abortion (over 1 million 
annually). The IRS has made abortion clinics “charitable” organizations, therefore exempt from 
taxes… Sin has permeated our land”.106 As historian Randall Balmer explains, Evangelicals like 
Falwell pushed for anti-abortion action within their congregations and across the country because 
pro-life was more “palatable” than segregation.107 Abortion debates worked surprisingly well in 
pursuing rather ignoble causes. Under the pretense of Godly remorse for the unborn, a political 
pro-life identity was born within Evangelism.  
Paul Weyrich saw abortion as a political tool for solidifying the conservative population 
and thus securing a Christian-based electoral force (see Figure 9). The name Weyrich appears in 
numerous news articles and scholarly literature as a strategist, advisor, and commentator who 
worked behind the scenes for politicians and pastors alike. Raised a Catholic and ordained as a 
Deacon in the Eastern Rite,108 he was nonetheless a key architect for modern Evangelism, co-
founding the Moral Majority and helping Reagan win the presidency. Weyrich included abortion 
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as part of a “pro-family” platform, 109 but he had no illusions about the abortion controversy.110 
He saw pro-life as an identity to bring together America’s conservative voters, a single-issue 
talking point alongside homosexuality, pornography, feminism, and so forth. “Yes, they’re 
emotional issues,” Weyrich admitted, “but that’s better than talking about capital formation 
[gathering contributions].”111 For Weyrich, the main problem with the conservative bloc was not 
a lack of numbers but a lack of unification. He blamed poor leadership, criticizing Goldwater for 
not stepping up to take charge when he had the chance.112 On the other hand, he also 
acknowledged a poor emotional drive in conservative communities. Conservatives needed issues 
if they were going to become politically active and unified. In a 1984 news report, Weyrich 
observed, “If we could work out how to get everyone singing the same tune about what people 
ought to be appointed [to government positions] and what policies adopted… I don’t think we 
would be resistible, to be frank… The only way is to frame the issues so that they incite grass-
roots people”.113 Weyrich’s main objective with abortion was to frame the issue for potential 
voters. As a Catholic, he understood that abortion was never a Protestant issue. He had to work 
to make it an issue and a premise of Protestant identity. 
The abortion issue was convenient in the way it could be melded with other conservative 
priorities. One debate that plagued Southern conservatives, in particular, was their seemingly 
relentless dispute over state rights and federal supremacy. The state rights argument goes all the 
way back to the Civil War and the South’s overt justification for secession. In the ‘70s and ‘80s, 
the argument reappeared in White Southern demand for school prayer and a segregated 
education system. They complained that federal law interfered with their effort “to conduct an 
institution or institutions of learning . . . giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the 
ethics revealed in the Holy scriptures”.114 In this context, Evangelical leaders referenced Roe v. 
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Wade as another outrageous example of judicial activism115 and a central government imposing 
its views on individuals (never mind the fact that Roe merely protected a woman’s right to 
choose). Similarly, abortion was thrown in with homosexuality, pornography, and feminism as 
an aspect of deteriorating American morality. No matter how different each specific issue may 
have been from one another, Evangelicals saw them all as one overarching problem of extreme 
liberalism that threatened family life, “the fundamental institution of society, an immutable 
structure established by our Creator”.116 Evangelicals made numerous other connections between 
abortion legalization and matters close to their hearts, but, as the aforementioned examples 
demonstrate, they all worked on an underlying premise that conservative Christians were morally 
right and liberal secular society was inherently wrong in the eyes of God. Pro-life was fashioned 
as an ideal of the righteous, a component of Evangelical identity (see Figure 13). 
 
IV. Pro-Life Identity — American Catholics 
The Catholic Church was the first organized religion to denounce abortion in the United 
States, but its position on the matter is notoriously inconsistent. Contemporary Americans tend to 
assume that Catholicism definitively opposes abortion without exception. The truth is far more 
complicated. Only 47 percent of American Catholics oppose abortion in all/most circumstances, 
compared to 48 percent of those who support abortion.117 Far more Mormons (70 percent) and 
Evangelicals (63 percent) reject abortion.118 In fact, of the major religious groups in the U.S., 
Jehovah’s Witnesses are, statistically speaking, the most pro-life (75 percent).119 The numbers 
may appear confusing at first given the fact that only the Catholic Church supported the 
physicians’ crusade against abortion in 1870 and was the main promoter of pro-life initiatives 
prior to Roe v. Wade. Church doctrine, however, is not immutable to the influences of a 
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particular era or the pressures of politics. History reveals that the Church has shifted its official 
position on abortion throughout the centuries, mainly because the philosophical basis for 
Catholic views on childbirth does not firmly establish life at the time of conception. On the 
contrary, the Catholic Church is perhaps as uncertain of the “life at conception” theory as the 
secular populace. Modern-day American Catholics are often pressured to accept the pro-life 
position to affirm their faith and defer to Church opinion. Pro-life is part of the Catholic identity 
only so long as popes, like the current Pope Francis, persist in equating abortion with hiring a 
“hitman”.120 
The philosophical basis for the Church’s current stance on abortion rests on the writings 
of two, pre-modern theologians. The Bible does not mention abortion. Pro-lifers who cite the 
Bible in their arguments merely pull excerpts that describe the value of life or the sin of murder. 
In the absence of Biblical law, the Church turned to the interpretations of Saint Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas.121 Augustine wrote on the topic between 125 and 426 A.D. (Enchiridion, On 
Marriage and Concupiscence, Against Julian, The City of God, Dialogues, and Confessions).122 
Augustine firmly disavowed a woman’s right to abort a pregnancy, but his arguments were not 
based on the assumption of fetal life. Strictly speaking, he was not pro-life, because he did not 
believe the fetus was endowed with life at conception — “ensoulment” took place at a later stage 
of fetal development, an idea reminiscent of “quickening” or trimesters.123 Augustine rejected 
abortion on the basis of libidinosa crudelitas (lustful cruelty), arguing that intimacy is only 
acceptable in the context of “nuptial embrace” and “child-bearing, which is the end and aim of 
marriage”.124 Abortion, in other words, was a sin for promoting promiscuity. Thomas Aquinas 
was uninterested in the topic of abortion, but he did discuss the beginning of life inside the 
womb. He espoused a view of hylomorphism. Basically, the human soul is in the shape of the 
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human body, and until the fetus resembles a human body, it is without a soul. In line with St. 
Augustine’s train of thought, Aquinas thought the fetus is subject to “delayed hominization” (i.e., 
the process of becoming human)125 implying that there is no error in aborting at an early stage of 
pregnancy. The Catholic Church adopted these interpretations, as evident in its refusal to baptize 
premature births in 1312 Venice.126 Modern Catholic pro-life identity is not based on an ancient 
tradition of “life at conception”. 
Anti-abortion movements in America follow from Papal decrees in the late nineteenth 
century and the reaffirmation of Vatican policy by succeeding pontificates. Dr. Horatio Storer, 
the man who led the physicians’ campaign, received an endorsement from the Catholic Church 
via Bishop Fitzpatrick of Boston, Massachusetts. In an 1860 treatise, he enthusiastically praised 
his new religious friend (despite his personal disgust for Catholics). He wrote, “an admirable 
letter I have lately received from the Catholic of Boston. The extracts are couched in so forcible 
language, and their spirit is so thoroughly Christian…”127 The Church, however, was carrying on 
a drama of the past five centuries regarding abortion. In the 14th century, St. Antonius of 
Florence excused abortionists: “although he impedes the ensoulment of a future fetus, he will not 
be the cause of death of any man”.128 Two hundred years later, a rather tyrannical Pope Sixtus V, 
known for overseeing the Venice inquisitions, banned all abortion on punishment of 
excommunication.129 The decree was rarely enforced. Sixtus’ successor, Gregory XIV, modified 
the ban in 1591 so that it applied only to abortions after ensoulment, or 166 days.130 Gregory 
XIV’s law remained in effect for 278 years until Pope Pius IX decided in 1869 to define “the 
beginning of life” at conception.131 Pius IX may have been motivated by his desire to strengthen 
Church doctrine in a turbulent era of European revolutions, growing secularization, and 
decreasing membership — what he called “ideological pluralism.”132 This latest Vatican ruling 
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has so far been upheld by succeeding popes. The current Pope Francis is certainly quite 
committed to maintaining a Catholic pro-life identity.  
Pro-life has been a useful political identity for Catholic Americans as it fosters 
ecumenism between the more dominant Protestant population and the Catholic minority. On 
March 29th, 1994, Evangelical and Catholic leaders put aside their historical differences to sign a 
declaration of cross-national unity, the “Evangelicals and Catholics Coming Together” statement 
(abbreviated as ECT). The document affirmed that Evangelicals and Catholics had a shared 
purpose in advancing God’s will during the impending second millennium, a purpose which 
superseded past quarrels “that obscure the one Christ and hinder the one mission.”133 Quoting 
John 17, the statement proclaimed its ecumenical intent, “May they all be one; as you, Father, are 
in me, and I in you, so also may they be in us, that the world may believe that you sent me.”134 In 
the context of American politics – the longstanding hostility between majority Protestants and 
smaller Catholic communities – the ECT was particularly momentous. Proponents of the 
statement, who included televangelist Pat Robertson and New York Archdiocese John Cardinal 
O’Connor, were motivated by the potential apocalypse of the second millennium, marketing 
conflicts in South America, and the bilateral causes that had brought divergent Christians 
together in the previous decade.135 Abortion, along with sexual depravity and Bible-based 
education, was one such bilateral issue. In a country where Catholics had been disparaged as a 
“cances” (i.e. cancer),136 the pro-life movement managed to pull Protestants and Catholics 
together under a single Christian identity (see Figure 15). The abortion controversy facilitated an 
ecumenical Christian identity — justified by declarations of shared sanctity despite America’s 
notoriously bigoted past. 
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Catholicism has become nearly synonymous with pro-life as a consequence of identity 
politics, thus indicating the importance of group formation in shaping stereotypes. Two days 
before the Vatican’s 2019 “National Day For Life” (Feb 3rd), Pope Francis described abortion as 
“a betrayal of our vocation, as well as of the pact that binds generations together, which allows 
us to look forward with hope.”137 He framed his words to suggest an inherent anti-abortion 
premise in Catholic faith. For most Americans, the link between the Church and pro-life belief is 
expected. Very few people outside the religion realize the variations in Catholic interpretations 
of scripture. As noted earlier, Catholics can and do accept abortion on the philosophy of Saint 
Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.138 Many Catholics also recognize the unique personal hardships 
that might necessitate abortions in some cases. In such circumstances, community priests often 
decide the matter at a local level, case-by-case, and with discretion for individual privacy. The 
late Dr. Ted Jelen, a well-respected political science professor at UNLV, described how women 
in his Chicago Polish neighborhood used to “go shopping for a priest” in order to receive 
spiritual sanctioning for abortions.139 Catholics who support abortion, however, often feel 
pressure to follow official Papal orders, as if pro-choice is an antithesis of Catholic faith.140 In a 
2017 op-ed, Catholics For Choice president Jon O’Brien denounced the “Catholic hierarchy 
around an agenda to discriminate against and impose their beliefs on Catholics and non-
Catholics alike.”141 Social identity affects the public image of all members of a particular group, 
overriding individual diversity for the sake of unification and leadership agenda (see Figure 14). 
 
VI. The Impact of Pro-Life Identity on Modern America Life  
Religiously affiliated interest groups have used anti-abortion rhetoric to separate 
themselves from secular, immoral society. Group identity is, by its very nature, divisive. It 
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fosters an “in-group”, out-group" mentality for the benefit of group members while promoting 
unfavorable perceptions of non-members. Almost four days after 9/11, Reverends Jerry Falwell 
and Pat Robertson blamed the tragedy on sinful Americans who had rejected the teachings of 
Evangelism. Jerry Falwell stated:  
The abortionists have got to bear some burden for this because God will not be mocked. 
And when we destroy 40 million little innocent babies, we make God mad. I really 
believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the 
lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the ACLU, People 
for the American Way, all of them who have tried to secularise America, I point the 
finger in their face and say, “You helped this happen.”142 
 
The premise behind Falwell’s reasoning is straightforward and bigoted: Individuals who do not 
conform to the “in-group” are dangerous, unpatriotic, and evil. Abortion debates help distinguish 
the correct, god-fearing individuals from non-believers. Ideological battles serve practical 
purposes while affording group members a misleading self-perception of superiority (moral 
superiority in this case). President Trump has diverted federal funds reserved for birth control 
clinics to “pro-life clinics” — ministries that provide family counseling to meet Title X’s criteria 
of a family-planning clinic.143 Whittier Pregnancy Care Clinic is one such “biblically-based” 
institution that describes itself with the terms “peace, healing, and restoration”144 as opposed to 
liberal, anti-family clinics. Interest groups justify their support and reach out to potential 
members by setting themselves apart from the crowd. Ideological concerns prove extremely 
effective for creating appealing identities. 
Group identity can lead to violence, and this is particularly true for the pro-life 
movement. Pro-life groups that frame the abortion debate along theological lines perpetuate the 
notion of a modern-day moral crusade with innocent lives and the fate of America hanging in the 
balance. It is little wonder that some activists pursue their cause by whatever means necessary. A 
former abortion provider, Patricia Baird-Windle, recalled in her 2001 book, Targets of Hatred, 
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the vitriol and violence her clinic and others endured through the ‘70s and ‘80s. Pro-lifers would 
protest outside clinics, gather near the homes of health-care providers, and taunt patients.145 
Eleven murders have occurred at the hands of extreme pro-lifers since the Roe decision.146 In 
2003, anti-abortion protestors gathered outside a Florida prison to mourn the execution of Paul 
Hill, a “hero” who shot and killed an abortion doctor leaving his clinic in July 1994.147 In the 
1990s, butyric acid bombs became a favored weapon of pro-lifers, a chemical that causes 
burning to the skin, as well as respiratory and digestive problems if inhaled. A hundred butyric 
acid attacks have been perpetrated against abortion providers and patients in the U.S.148 From 
1977 to 2014, there have been 199 cases of battery/assault, 1500 vandalisms, 4 kidnappings, and 
182 arsons.149 While pro-life leaders create an “us-them” mentality in their religious arguments, 
followers who see themselves as part of war construe pro-life violence as an ethically acceptable, 
perhaps even necessary, tactic (see Figure 16). 
Abortion politics molded by interest group identity subverts private hardships and the 
intimate choices of female patients. Surgical abortions (as opposed to contraceptive pills) are 
medical procedures, as terrifying and intrusive as any other invasive surgery. Women do not 
choose abortions as mere afterthoughts, but as carefully considered options with the risk of 
bodily harm, the costs of the procedure, and the consequences on their family life firmly in their 
conscience. Abortions conveyed as “flippant” choices perpetuate a myth that undermines female 
experience in the real world and gives undue credit to abstract theological arguments and 
dogmatic public disputes.150 Philosopher Leslie Cannold asserts that abortions are indeed ethical 
choices, not because of public concerns, but for the individual — “the moral experience of 
individuals … who must actually face particular moral dilemmas in the course of living their 
lives…”151 Historian Rickie Solinger describes patient experiences before Roe v. Wade in her 
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book The Abortionist. When prosecutions became more common in the conservative ‘50s and the 
politically turbulent ‘60s, lawyers would threaten patients to testify against their abortion 
providers. The trials were gut-wrenching experiences for women, their lives and bodies 
displayed before a public court to be judged and ridiculed by complete strangers:   
“You should have thought of marriage before you got whatever you got” 
“You are the girl who said you and your husband could not afford a child, is that right? I believe 
you own a 1957 hardtop automatic, don’t you?” 
“If she can afford a new car and not a baby, it certainly casts doubt on her credibility...” 152 
Roe v. Wade was intended to protect women’s privacy, but, in many ways, women’s lives are 
still being judged through public debates. Pro-life arguments decide who is morally right and 
who is wrong. The abortion controversy is just another public trial, but it is a trial arranged by 
groups who want to convey their moral superiority, their sense of identity, at the expense of 
women’s private lives. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 In everyday American life, one can readily observe the power of pro-life identity in 
shaping politics, law, and social behavior. At the beginning of March 2020, West Virginia state 
legislators passed a bill that would penalize doctors if they fail to administer care to a newborn 
accidentally born-alive during an abortion procedure. The bill’s Republican drafters admitted 
that the new law was pointless given the impossibility of live birth abortion under the state’s 
current trimester restrictions and because the law already protects all newborns, no matter the 
circumstances of birth.153 The drafters merely wanted to bolster their public image amongst pro-
life constituents before the upcoming May elections. By passing this so-called “Born-Alive 
  Brown  30 
 
   
 
Abortion Survivors Protection Act”, GOP lawmakers got to play the role of moral leaders, or, as 
Gov. Jim Justice stated, “to put a stake in the sand that says for us, for us at least we stand for life 
and we stand for the right stuff.”154 Pro-life voter support such leaders to bolster their own moral 
identities. Alabama made a similar move last year (2019), by trying to enact a near-total ban on 
abortion with the “Human Life Protection Act”, which compared abortions to the Jewish 
Holocaust, the destructive consequences of China’s Great Leap Forward, as well as the tragedies 
in Cambodia (1970s) and Rwanda (1994).155 GOP proponents in Alabama knew that the bill 
could be overturned or blocked, but they were making a statement about themselves and the pro-
life movement. In modern America, abortion itself is, oddly enough, becoming less relevant to 
abortion policy in a political atmosphere that caters to group social identity. All that matters are 
the symbolic gestures individuals embrace to show their membership in a community of moral 
Americans. 
Modern scholars should observe ongoing abortion conflicts to understand how other 
social identities might impact political and social institutions. In recent years, America has also 
witnessed the rise of other social movements from environmentalism to gun rights. As with 
abortion, relevant and tangible policies may stem from such movements, but there is also a 
symbolic aspect to their ideas. Republicans eagerly group gun rights, pro-life, and school-prayer 
together on conservative platforms despite only tentative connections between the issues. The 
NRA imbues their pro-gun arguments with religious references and defines their supporters as 
conservative Christians, yet religion has nothing to do with gun ownership or the Second 
Amendment.  On the other hand, environmental awareness has somehow been categorized as a 
purely liberal concern although environmental depletion affects all humans, no matter their party 
line. Republican leaders have firmly positioned themselves as anti-environmentalists, with 
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Donald Trump pulling out of the Paris Climate Accord156 and George H.W. Bush rejecting the 
Kyoto Protocol.157 In fact, younger Republicans are becoming disillusioned by the party over its 
continued, often irrational, denial of environmental problems.158 Perhaps the history of abortion 
in America can offer a new perspective of other equally divisive issues in contemporary U.S. 
society. Interest groups have developed identities through various issues. 
The abortion debate may be new to American life, but interest groups perpetuate the 
conflict so as to continually define and redefine conservatism and Christianity in America. Henry 
Tajfel’s social identity theory helps explain abortion politics in the context of interest group 
competition. Abortion was never a public issue in early America. The first opponents were 
physicians with their own professional, economic, and selfish motivations. The physicians’ 
crusade successfully illegalized abortion for almost eighty years until the activist climate of the 
1960s forced states and citizens to reconsider the existing laws. Once the Supreme Court passed 
Roe v. Wade, a strong national pro-life movement still did not materialize until the late 1970s. 
The Republican party, Evangelicals, and Catholics framed abortion as a national controversy for 
reasons that extend beyond simple moral concerns. Politics, racism, economics, etc., have 
contributed to the rise of pro-lifers, but there is also an underlying influence of interest group 
identity. The pro-life position is a convenient identity to unify millions of Americas who want to 
present themselves as moral, conservative Christians superior to the liberal, sinful masses. 
Abortion politics occupies such a brief chapter in our nation’s history, yet it has come to 
overwhelm our contemporary psyche. All Americans — pro-life, pro-choice, and the undecided 
— have forgotten the difficult, personal choices behind abortion procedures. We presume that 
abortion has been and always will be a major domestic issue along with taxes, labor rights, law 
and order, and so forth. Abortions are private matters highjacked by interest groups to shape their 
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moral identities. Interest groups depict abortions according to their own motivations, but reality 
is far more complex. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1. Social identity theory159 
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Figure 2. President Donald Trump speaks at the 47th March For Life rally in Washington.160 
 
 
Figure 3.  44th annual March for Life, January 27, 2017 in Washington, DC.161 
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Figure 4. Advertisements from the New York Sun. Mrs. Bird offers pills for treatment of 
menstrual irregularity and Madame Costello offers help for “obstruction of their monthly 
periods.”162 
 
Figure 5. Beechum’s Pills were advertised as a cure-all for indigestion, cramps, and obstructed 
menses in the 1800s.163 
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Figure 6. Nineteenth-Century ad for abortifacient pills.164 
 
 
Figure 7. Pro-Life, Republican Rally.165 
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Figure 8. President Ronald Reagan and Rev. Jerry Falwell.166 
 
 
Figure 9. Paul Weyrich, shown in a 2007 photo, was the first president of the Heritage 
Foundation and helped found the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition.167 
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Figure 10. Mrlc News, a Pro-life Movement (1982).168
 
 
Figure 11. Jerry Falwell on the Campaign trail, 1980.169 
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Figure 12. People taking part in an anti-abortion march hold signs as they stand on the steps of 
the Legislative building at the Capitol in Olympia, Wash.170
 
 
 
Figure 13. Anti-abortion activist Katherine Aguilar holds a crucifix and prays as opponents and 
supporters of abortion rights gather in Austin, Texas, in July 2013.171 
 
  Brown  40 
 
   
 
Figure 14. Protesting Pro-Abortion Catholics.172
 
 
Figure 15. Thomas Nast, Anti-Catholic Cartoon.173
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Figure 16. Violence and the Pro-Life Movement.174 
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